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Foreword by Christian Kvorning 
Lassen 
The overcoming of adversity and hope prevailing 
forms the core of great narratives, be they personal, 
national or international. The end of World War II and later 
the Cold War led to the proclamation of “the end of history”, 
reinforcing the utopian notion that hope had prevailed for 
good after seemingly endless struggles.  
It is easy, even human, to view the trauma of 1968 in 
then-Czechoslovakia as just another temporary setback in 
the inexorable and inevitable advance of democracy, 
freedom, and, more ephemerally, hope. 
Yet in 1968, hope died in then-Czechoslovakia. As 
tanks rolled into Wenceslas square, entire generations 
watched as their human struggle for independence and 
freedom was crushed by a superpower to whom 
fundamental rights, freedom and democracy were 
anathema. For a long time, entire generations were 
destined to a life under the yoke of oppression with no 
prospect of freedom or independence. For a long time, 
children would grow up in a world devoid of inviolable 
rights, a world where might made right. It would take more 
than 20 years until, on the very same square, hope was 




Since then, the Czech Republic has become an 
independent country, achieved hitherto unparalleled levels 
of freedom and prosperity, and developed into a fully-
fledged democracy and valuable member of the 
international community. It is thus unsurprising, even 
human, that the trauma, hardship and tragedy of 1968 has 
slowly been relegated to the farthest recesses of our 
collective memory, its lessons and meaning slowly eroded 
or even forgotten.  
It has been 50 years now since this fateful event. The 
international world order, to which the Czech Republic is 
now part of, is once again under threat, this time not only 
from external adversaries, but even more so from within as 
many European, primarily former Soviet-bloc, states turn 
their backs on the hard-won liberal democracy and instead 
turn to the very authoritarianism that their ancestors fought 
so bravely and admirably to defeat.  
As cultural, societal and political upheaval once again 
rumbles across Europe, ruminations on the broader 
European historical contexts of the Prague Spring, and 
especially the cultural, intellectual, social and political forces 
driving it, are merited; it cannot and should not be viewed 
as a singular, national event only, especially given 
contemporary developments, which concerns us all. This 
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was one of the key goals of this project, which featured both 
public conferences bringing together experts with various 
scientific backgrounds from across Europe, as well as four 
essays written by accomplished scholars and experts on 
political science and history. They are essential reading for 
anyone interested in Czechoslovak history as well as 
transformative reformist movements in general.  
Now, more than ever, it is time to reflect on the 
meaning of 1968 and rediscover the valuable lessons it 
taught us. Thus, it is our hope that the four publications 
enclosed within this project will give cause for reflection not 
only on 1968 but also the future, so that the flame of hope, 
after decades of subjugation and hardship, may continue to 








Rick Fawn: How did the events of 
1968 influence regional and 
European cooperation after 
1989? 
On the occasion of paying tribute to the courage of the 
Prague Spring reforms and marking the tragedy of their 
extinction following the military intervention of 1968, it may 
seem slightly contrarian to offer two observations on their 
impact on post-1989 regional cooperation. That is in no way 
to diminish the importance of the events of 1968 in 
Czechoslovak, European and global history. However, to 
address the question posed, it is argued here that the 
influence of 1968 on post-1989 regional cooperation was 
belated and indirect. 
Indeed, if the events immediately prompted regional 
solidarity, it was of the eight (single-digit eight!) Soviet 
dissidents who protested in Red Square against the military 
intervention in Czechoslovakia, and who met punitive 
reprisals for their bravery. 1   A fiftieth anniversary 
commemoration was held in Moscow. Perhaps telling of 
Russia’s current repressive atmosphere, it was already 
confined in numbers and while entirely peaceful 
nevertheless resulted in arrests.2 
Otherwise, antecedents from 1968 for post-
communist cooperation were deferred and indirect. Trying 
to achieve ‘regional cooperation’ at any level and in any way 
went against historical counterexamples. With 1968, the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization had become the first military 
alliance in history to have attacked itself.  And both before 
and after that, the bloc’s Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, the supposed common market for the socialist 
bloc, was said to spread inefficiency and poverty. 
                                                   
1  Current reflection of the Soviet protest includes Mark 
Kramer, ‘The August 1968 Red Square Protest and Its Legacy’ 
(Washington, DC: Wilson Center, August 24, 2018), available at: 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/the-august-1968-red-
square-protest-and-its-legacy.  
2 See ‘Russian Police Detain Three People Marking 1968 Red 
Square Protest’ (RFE/RL, August 25, 2018), available at: 
Czechoslovak dissident reflection not just immediately 
after 1968 but for succeeding years was very much, and 
understandably, directed inwards. True, Karel Kosík wrote a 
piece in 1969 entitled ‘Co je střední Europa?’ (What is 
central Europe?), but it sparked neither immediate nor later 
debate remotely comparable to that of writings in the 1980s. 
Two leading examples of dissident concern in the decade 
that followed 1968 were Havel’s letter to Prague Spring 
reformer Alexander Dubček in 1969, calling on him to stand 
his ground against intolerable Soviet pressure. The second 
was Havel’s open letter of 1975 to Communist leader Gustav 
Husák, which addressed the apathy and humiliation that the 
post-1968 order imposed on Czechoslovak society. 
Important tracts these were, but not regarding possibilities 
of trans-border dissident cooperation.  
The belated impact of 1968 on regional cooperation 
perhaps started with Havel’s ‘Power of the Powerless’ of 
1978. That essay provided a literary and exacting analysis 
of the socialist-type political system (and one better than 
the efforts of many political scientists). The tract was also a 
symbolic landmark in Czechoslovak-Polish cooperation, 
written for and dedicated to the emerging dissident 
connections between the two countries.3 
But that cooperation was necessarily narrow. 
Participants from both sides spent enormous energy 
evading their respective security services simply to be able 
to meet in the mountains.  Few dissident connections 
existed with Hungary, despite its relatively permissive 
political environment in the 1980s. That relationship lacked 
the cultural – and linguistic – connections of the 
Czechoslovak-Polish, even if Hungarian György Konrád’s 
Antipolitics was known among dissidents and read 
internationally alongside Havel’s work.4 Cooperation with 
East Germany was even more confined. Polish underground 
media even stated that ‘the natural representative of the 
interests’ of East Germans was West Germany, which in turn 
https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-police-detain-three-people-
marking-1968-red-square-protest-czechoslovakia/29453057.html.  
3  Communist-era full English language publication of the 
three tracts appeared together for example in Vaclav Havel, Living 
in Truth (London: Faber & Faber, 1989).  





seemed to infer that the nascent dissident discussion of the 
possibilities for ‘Central Europe’ had both a format and a 
content that was ‘without Germans’.5  
Dissent became formalised in Czechoslovakia around 
the Charter 77 document, which politely asked the 
Czechoslovak regime to observe its domestic law and to 
abide by the norms to which it agreed in the Helsinki Final 
Act two years prior. Leading Czechoslovak opposition 
figures were arrested as they went to mail their otherwise 
innocuous document to Czechoslovak government officials.6 
As Czechoslovak activists faced court and jail in the late 
1970s, regional solidarity grew with Polish activists. 
Once the strikes led by the self-governing trade union 
Solidarność (Solidarity) began to paralyse Poland in 1980, 
Poles were less able to aid Czechoslovakia. Rather than 
replicating the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 
1968, a learning lesson by being multilateral rather than the 
unilateral Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, Moscow 
settled on having Warsaw’s communists confront the 
unprecedented unrest. Homegrown repression took the 
place of a bloc intervention, and Poles faced the agonies of 
martial law in 1981. Retrospectively, Solidarność leader 
Lech Wałęsa said that he imagined coordinated anti-
communist resistance after martial law, and that ‘We held 
consultations and talked with an eye to maybe mounting 
another more powerful struggle through organizing East 
Central Europe’.7 
Such direct cooperation, of course, did not materialise. 
Some dissidents in Czechoslovakia in summer 1989 to 
whom I later spoke gained encouragement from Solidarność 
friends of the late 1970s being able not only to travel to 
Czechoslovakia but as parliamentarians, and on diplomatic 
passports.  
                                                   
5 See the reference in Jacques Rupnik, ‘Central Europe or 
Mittleuropa’, in Stephen Graubard (ed.), Eastern Europe … Central 
Europe … Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 253-4. 
The post-1989 Czechoslovak government worked with East 
Germany on a proposal to the CSCE but East German 
representatives were not invited to multilateral forums in 1990. 
Germany, however, was included in many formats thereafter. 
6 Still perhaps the best account of Charter 77 remains that by 
Canadian H. Gordon Skilling.  The first page recounts how Havel, 
Certainly dissident-era regional cooperation is 
remembered and has been mobilised.  But in that way, 1968 
still only projected indirect, if symbolic importance on post-
1989 regional cooperation.  
One can judge diplomatic successes by how many 
claim the origins of something successful (while defeat, as 
Kennedy said of the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco, is an orphan). 
The birth of Visegrad has been adamantly claimed in 
subsequent years by all four member states.8 But it is Havel, 
as Czechoslovak president, who mobilised the dissident-era 
cooperation as both a practical and also, and especially, a 
symbolic basis for post-1989 cooperation. 
Less than a month in the post of Czechoslovak 
president, Havel addressed the Polish Sejm and Senate. 
With historical irony, Communist General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, overseer of martial law, remained President of 
Poland and was one of Havel’s official hosts. Havel invoked 
two important measures that underline the pre-1989, and 
thus the post-1968, ethos of dissident solidarity. 
He reminded this now external audience that his New 
Year’s speech, broadcast throughout Czechoslovak, had 
emphasized that ‘the Hungarian and the Poles bled for us.  
We are well aware of this and we will not forget it.’ He 
wanted Czechoslovaks to known that, and then he was 
reiterating that importance to Czechoslovaks’ immediate 
neighbours.  
Havel quickly translated that communist-era, post-
1968 experience, into an idea for urgent post-1989 foreign 
policy coordination, proclaiming: ‘We should not compete 
with each other to gain admission into the various European 
organizations. On the contrary, we should assist each other 
in the same spirit of solidarity with which, in darker days, 
you protested against our persecution as we did against 
actor Pavel Landovský and author Ludvík Vaculík tried to evade 
police simply to deposit the Charter in mailboxes. Charter 77 and 
Human Rights in Czechoslovakia (London: Allen Unwin, 1981). 
7 ‘Lech Walesa: Overcoming Fear’, in the Václav Havel virtual 
library, aAvailable at: http://www.vhlf.org/havel-archives/lech-
walesa-overcoming-fear/.  
8 A draft paper by the author (if not also by others) has 





yours.’ 9  Common cooperation now could serve all well 
together. He followed that message within his speech by 
calling for a meeting in Bratislava. On that he delivered only 
three months later, if also hastily-arranged. 10 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were the core 
participating countries, but Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia 
were included also. 
Limited efforts at other trilateral cooperation emerged 
in the course of 1990 and we might debate why exactly it 
was in February 1991 that Visegrad would be launched. And 
there, and I think cleverly, Visegrad introduced itself to the 
world as serving to reaffirm the region’s intrinsic European 
values.11 The Group did not simply seek to ‘join’ Europe, in 
the sense of institutional memberships, but to signal that 
the region had always been fundamentally European – it 
was not only a consumer but a common producer, with the 
West, of those values. Visegrad was geoculturally and 
existentially moving itself westward, without of course 
going physically anywhere. Kundera’s landmark text of 
1983/84 (which, apparently, he never subsequently wanted 
republished),12 of a kidnapped West forcibly dragged East, 
had now been released from geocultural captivity. Better 
still, within the space of two years, the name and symbolism 
of Visegrad was established. As but one example, already 
in 1992 the EC not only referred to Visegrad, but met with 
Visegrad as the so-named group at its European Summit. 
Other post-communist countries were quickly left behind in 
this apparent fast-march West, and even their leaders 
mentioned Visegrad as a standard for their own.13   
                                                   
9  Office of the President, ‘The Polish Sejm and Senate. 
Warsaw, January 25, 1990’, available at: 
http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/index_uk.html.  
10 Every contemporary to whom I have spoken or whose 
recollections are available in print suggest that the meeting, if a 
landmark, was still poorly organised. The important measure was 
to get regional together and initiate an ethos of discussion and then 
of cooperation.   
11  See the text ‘Visegrad Declaration 1991’, available at: 
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-
declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412.  
12  See the commentary in the introduction in George 
Schopflin and Nancy Wood (eds), In Search of Central Europe 
(London: Polity, 1993). 
Visegrad cooperation stumbled and collapsed in the 
mid-1990s and was resurrected in 1998 and formally in 
1999, briefly even being called Visegrad II. The imperative 
of continuity won out and the name remained unqualified 
as Visegrad. The Group’s member-states necessarily had to 
negotiate NATO and EU accession alone and entered neither 
organization as the Visegrad Four.14 It retained its format 
thereafter, smartly retaining its original membership despite 
calls from outsiders to join, while inviting others to join its 
‘Visegrad +’ platform when mutually beneficial.   
References to post-1968 regional cooperation among 
dissidents appear unevenly in contemporary cooperation. In 
the lengthy annual presidency programmes and annual 
reports, each country presidency varies in its reference to 
communist-era dissident cooperation. Some Visegrad 
programmes and reports make no reference, while Polish 
Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski was probably most 
explicit when he wrote  that Visegrad drew from the 
communist-era spirit of ‘joint struggle for democratic 
change’ that Havel subsequently used to ignite Visegrad.15  
However, now the use of similar words, such as 
‘opposition’ in Visegrad documents refer to resistance in the 
EU, and to EU policies.16  That is particularly to do with the 
so-called ‘migrant’ crisis and quotas for the relocation of 
entrants into the EU. 17  Perhaps ironically, Visegrad has 
generated for itself the most international rénomé of its 
now-considerable history. Inspirational historical legacies 
are hardly static: rather, they risk having multiple uses far 
beyond original intentions.   
13 Examples from the 1990s are given in Rick Fawn, ‘The 
Elusive Defined? Visegrad Cooperation as the Contemporary 
Contours of Central Europe’, Geopolitics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Summer 
2001), pp. 47-68. 
14 Slovakia did not enter NATO with the other three in 19990; 
and the Four were joined in the 2004 EU enlargement by the Baltic 
Republics, Slovenia and non-socialist Cyprus and Malta. 
15 ‘Foreword of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Poland Radosław Sikorski’, in Report of the Polish Presidency of the 
Visegrad Group, July 2012 – June 2013 (Warsaw, 2013), p. 5. 
16 Drawn from a comparative study available from the author. 
17 A brief effort at synthesis is offered in Rick Fawn, ‘External 
assessments of Visegrad since its international recognition over the 
“migrant” crisis’, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs 





Andrea Petö: The Prague Spring 
and the 1968 Warsaw Pact 
Invasion of Czechoslovakia in an 
international context 
There has been a lot written on 1968 recently as we 
turn to history in trying to understand contemporary 
developments. The roundtable upon which this paper is 
based followed this vein by exploring five issues each 
illustrated with a quote, which are neglected topics of the 
discussion: how to understand the revolt, how geopolitical 
factors influencing the process of remembrance, who were 
the intermediaries and what did they understand the 
situation using historical analogies and how the ‘dissent 
culture’ made women invisible in the opposition. The 
questions were formulated and selected by Andrea Pető and 
commented by Petra James and Jakub Machek. 
1. The context: what was 1968? A “global 
disruption”? How to move from the cultural 
and Cold War logic determined definition to 
understanding Revolt?  
“There was no nihilism in the contestation that burned 
up that month of May 1968; instead it was a violent desire 
to rake over the norms that govern the private as well as 
the public, the intimate as well as the social, a desire to 
come up with new, perpetually contestable configurations. 
This desire for an exhilarating and joyful "permanent 
revolution" was perhaps just part and parcel of young 
people abreacting their "second Oedipus," i.e. their 
adolescence, on the back of an obsolete State and a 
prurient consumer society. But by all accounts, it was sexual 
and cultural contestation that spearheaded events, and 
young people were rightly mistrustful of the political "co-
opting" the trade unions and leftwing parties tried to impose 
on that "spring," as well as the workers' intrinsic 
"consumerism."” 
(Julia Kristeva, What's Left of 1968?, Revolt, She Said. 
An Interview by Philippe Petit, Semiotex(e) 2002, 12.) 
In response, Petra James pointed out that we could 
think of the “1968 revolt movements” as of a global moment 
of the re-negotiation of the norm (aesthetic, social, political). 
We could give the example of the European reception of the 
Beat Generation. Indeed, in countries as varied in terms of 
political structure as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Norway, 
Iceland, Finland, Hungary, Poland or Czechoslovakia, the 
works and activities of members of Beat Generation served 
as a vector of challenge to the establishment (that of 
conservatism, conformism, consumerism, materialism etc.), 
even if the local constellations could take extremely diverse 
forms. The structuralist theory could be quite helpful here. 
We are thinking for example of the influential study of 1936 
by Jan Mukařovský, Aesthetic function, norm and value as 
social facts. Indeed, we could understand the 1968 as a 
global effort of re-negotiating the “norm”, in societies that 
differed dramatically in terms of their “structures.” It 
certainly was a challenge of the establishment and figures 
(real or symbolic) of authority as referred to Kristeva. 
2. What is the role of tradition of protest in 
Central Europe: 1953, 1956, 1968, 1981 in 
the time of “mnemonic security” becomes a 
geopolitical factor?  
“Central Europe therefore cannot be defined and 
determined by political frontiers (which are inauthentic, 
always imposed by invasions, conquests, and occupations), 
but by the great common situations that reassemble 
peoples, regroup them in ever new ways along the 
imaginary and ever-changing boundaries that mark a realm 
inhabited by the same memories, the same problems and 
conflicts, the same common tradition.” 
(Milan Kundera: The Tragedy of Central Europe, The 
New York Review of Books, April 26, 1984; 33) 
Petra James underlined that the great merit of 
Kundera of bringing and keeping “Central Europe” in public 
debates of the 1980s in the general context of competing 
causes of numerous human rights initiatives and 
movements of international solidarity (for example the 
important Anti-Apartheid movement or movement of 





Jakub Machek quoted Vladimír Macura, who said that 
from the 19th century that Czech intellectuals were 
alternately propagated connection of Czech nation to the 
East or to the West depending on the situation and their 
political orientation. The notion of Central Europe was 
developed in 1970s and 1980s as a counterweight to the 
division of Europe into Eastern and Western part, to show, 
that there a specific area, distinct from the eastern soviet 
lands, with different development, distinct culture and so on. 
After the 1989 velvet revolution, the idea of Central 
Europeaness of Czech republic was replaced by the notion 
that Czechs are returning back to western Europe, and they 
are more culturally and economically western than the other 
post socialist countries, so they can see it as a return to the 
east/west divide of the Czech mentality. Surprisingly, in the 
last years, the idea of Central Europe as the area of common 
culture, experiences and specific values is back, 
appropriated by conservative and extreme right-wing 
speakers. It is based on refusal of the western world as 
decadent, neo-Marxist, under the dictatorship of European 
Union and so on. Therefore, in this conception, the Central 
Europe is connected by the common historical experience 
of German and Russian occupation, living under external 
dictatorship with huge propaganda, so the population learnt 
not to be naïve and trustful as people living in Western 
Europe. The people of Central Europe have experience in 
how to not believe in propaganda (it also means western 
liberal and neo-Marxist propaganda), to be cautious about 
the domination of big power (it is meant EU) and of invasion 
(of refugees). The experience of the lost protests and 
occupation can be also seen in the strong distrust in elites, 
who started the protests and then betrayed it. In this 
process, conservative and extreme right concept of Central 
Europe, the Czech experience of the 20th century, which was 
full of invasions and dictatorships, taught people to look at 
the outside world as a danger, so it is better to lock 
themselves away, not to have any ambitions and only care 
about themselves.   
3. What were the forms of control, “politics of 
intervention” and how what was the impact 
in Czechoslovakia and in other Warsaw Pact 
countries? Who were the intermediaries? 
What did they gain? What were the 
consequences as far as political imagination 
and symbolic are concerned? 
“That's why, when the Russians occupied 
Czechoslovakia, they did everything possible to destroy 
Czech culture. This destruction had three meanings: first, it 
destroyed the center of the opposition; second, it 
undermined the identity of the nation, enabling it to be 
more easily swallowed up by Russian civilization; third, it 
put a violent end to the modern era, the era in which culture 
still represented the realization of supreme values”. 
(Milan Kundera: The Tragedy of Central Europe, The 
New York Review of Books; April 26, 1984; 33.) 
Petra James pointed out that Kundera, somewhat 
uncharacteristically of him, is using in this famous text 
strategies of deliberate emotional appeal. These tools of 
public communications have been actively developed and 
put into practical use within human rights groups such as 
Amnesty International, an important player from the 1970s 
in the field of human rights. The Helsinki Conference of 
1976 did give fundamental basis for the legalistic nature of 
Eastern European dissident movements. At the same time, 
it gave rise to numerous human rights initiatives that 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s created numerous causes 
thus competing with the dissident cause for the attention of 
media and public. The emotional narrative strategy of 
Kundera’s text could be interpreted within this larger 
context.  
Jakub Machek emphasized that it is usually described 
as a characteristic for the 1970s and 1980s normalization 
period, but in fact has started already in 1960s or even 
1950s, as it is nicely depicted by writers as Vladimír Páral or 
Josef Jedlička as well as in films of Miloš Forman and 
Jaroslav Papoušek. The new authorities emerging after 
1968 just utilized the desired return to the “normal” society, 
ordinary life based on middleclass (or petit bourgeois) 
values including consumerism and access to western 
popular culture (or its local variant) of the 1960s society yet 
offered it to the citizens without the possibility to participate 
in public sphere, as was the other demand of the 1960s. 
This politics used to be described a kind of deal or 





materialistic life instead of a participatory democracy. The 
other part was the deal was the concept of technocratic 
governance, that the society should be led by experts and 
their expert knowledge not by “the people.” As Vítězslav 
Sommer recently stated, this idea also emerges in 1960s, 
when the experts should be better managers than the 
communist authorities, but in the 1970s the technocratic 
governance replaced the democratic control, which was 
seen as chaotic, populistic and not sufficient. That paved 
the way for the 1989 smooth velvet revolution. 
4. Historia est magistra vitae. What is the role 
of historical analogies? How do 
interpretations of past event influence 
epistemological frames, symbolic 
imaginaries and present political action?  
“[T]he current events [in Czechoslovakia] are not a 
repetition of the events of 1956 in Hungary. In Hungary the 
popular masses revolted against the party and Central 
Committee, whereas in Czechoslovakia, the masses are 
speaking out only against the conservatives and the group 
around [the hard-liner Antonín] Novotný and are supporting 
the [KSČ], the Central Committee, and friendship with the 
Soviet Union”. (Quoted Petro Shelest on 21 March 1968) 
“In Hungary in 1956, the imperialists urged the local 
reactionaries to embark on an armed attack to seize power, 
whereas in Czechoslovakia they are trying to establish a 
bourgeois order by “peaceful means.” That is, they are 
trying gradually to change the situation so that the 
reactionaries can gradually seize one position after 
another. . . . [The anti-Soviet elements in Czechoslovakia] 
do not dare to speak out openly in support of anti-
Communist and anti-Soviet demands. They understand 
[from the decisive Soviet response in 1956] that this game 
is over once and for all. The enemies provide cover for 
themselves with demagogic statements about “friendship” 
with the Soviet Union, while at the same time sowing doubts 
about some sort of “inequality” and about the pursuit of a 
special, “independent” foreign policy. They are also trying 
to undercut the leading role of the [Communist] Party”. 
(Petro Shelest on 25 April 1968) 
(The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Edited by Günter Bischof, Stefan 
Karner, and Peter Ruggenthaler, Rowman and Littlefield, 
2010. 43 and 44.) 
Petra James warned that there was a crucial divide 
and substantial misunderstanding of the meaning and 
efforts of the Prague Spring by Western leftist intellectuals. 
The French case was commented on par example by Pierre 
Grémion. This is certainly a divide that is still very visible in 
the memory of those who lived in Czechoslovakia and in 
Western Europe in 1968 and would deserve more profound 
analysis.  
Jakub Machek pointed out that in the Czechoslovak 
20th century history usually the very important years ending 
with number 8, as the beginning of Czechoslovak republic 
in 1918, its end starting with Munich Agreement in 1938 and 
subsequent Nazi invasion in the next year. The communist 
putsch in 1948, the Soviet invasion. In 1968 and also the 
velvet revolution in 1989 is sometimes seen as the 8th 
anniversary (just one year delayed). In these years usually 
started different regimes has started in Czech history, so 
the looking for analogies and comparison is very popular 
nowadays. Usually they compare the 1939 and 1968 as far 
as invasion is concerned or 1968 and 1989 as far as 
democratic movements are concerned. More interesting is 
to compare 1918, 1968 and 1989 as the moment for looking 
for the new democratic organization of the society. Yet what 
he found most interesting is the comparison of the 
capitulations in 1938 and in 1968, when both of them 
started as an external pressure but ended as establishing of 
the new regime with very active domestic authorities, who 
immediately and radically settled accounts with previous, 
more democratic regimes and its authorities. Both new 
regimes after 1938 and after 1968 radically denied previous 
development and ideas, the previous regimes were based 
on. And implemented a change of elites. As all the previous 
regimes lasted maximum 20 years, ended usually by 
occupation or revolution, the last 30 years of Czech history 
is a rare exception. There is no military occupation now, but 
society has a stronger and stronger feeling that outside 
pressure still exists, which they have to resist. In that scope, 





power.  Similarly, Czechs can observe the rejection of 
existing elites, its western orientation and so on, which 
resemble the post-1968 normalization, including the already 
mentioned the escape to “a private domain” and 
technocratic form of governance, symbolized by our present 
prime minister. 
 
5. Rethinking opposition and protest. Vaclav 
Havel and other male intellectuals created 
the heroic, elitist figure of “The Dissent” 
based Václav Havel’s essay, The Power of 
the Powerless. Women are invisible in this 
logic no matter that dissents were operating 
in “spousal units”: men were visible as 
acting in public, and women were 
supportive as resistance is a spectrum. 
Czech women saw themselves as powerful 
due to the legacy of interwar Czech women’s 
movement and statist emancipation. Most 
women oppositionists operated in this “grey 
zone,” (Jirina Siklova) not because they 
were conforming, but because oppositionist 
activities could be carried out in the private, 
or domestic sphere, giving women greater 
scope for anti-regime activities. In 1968, the 
birthrate in Czechoslovakia fell dramatically, 
reaching an all-time low in 1968. The post-
1968 normalization shifted women with 
social welfare incentives to private sphere to 
motherhood where women reclaimed the 
private sphere and exercised their own 
power by determining how this sphere 
would appear. What are the consequences 
for present protest strategies the legacy of 
“The Dissent” as the only strategy? How the 
rhetoric of traditional feminine qualities as 
an element of emancipation might be 
utilized when the political influence and 
liberal rhetoric of “western” feminism 
reclaiming the public sphere is declining, 
and anti-modernist emancipation rhetoric is 
on the rise not only in Czech Republic but 
elsewhere?  
“I thought – and I do not think I was alone in that – 
that this was the only solution for how to change the society. 
For me, there was no other alternative than these so-called 
communists or socialists. Because I never – and I was a sort 
of half-adult at the time – had never really experienced a 
different regime. And I saw that a reform process had 
started and that there are possibilities here. Secondly, this 
was after we’d seen a similar process occur in Hungary 
[crushed by tanks in 1956] and that it started the changes 
here in the beginning of the 60s. At this time, I was in the 
Faculty, and the atmosphere there was different. In the 60s, 
I was a young mother as my children were born at the 
beginning of the decade, but when the changes started in 
the mid-60s, then I participated. Not only at the Faculty, but 
we had also started a so-called high school ‘student 
committee’ which I think was relatively progressive for the 
time. I thought that changes were possible, and I remember 
that in the summer of 1967, the writers’ congress was 
stopped and what was a very famous paper at the time, 
Literární [Noviny or] Listy, was shut down. For me it was an 
impulse that it was important to start with some activities 
and to support the writers that had been dismissed. So, 
then I started to not only be a member of the communist 
party, but at the beginning of 1968, I was the head of one 
organization at the Philosophical Faculty. (….) But you need 
to understand that we had plenty of emancipation from 
above. It was organized. Here, there was a duty to work. In 
fact, it was not only a duty but really the only possibility. It 
was normal for us and our women had different experiences 
than the women from the West. And when these Western 
European and American feminists arrived in the country, we 
could see that we were different here.”  
(Interview with Jirina Siklova, 2012, 23 July 
http://www.radio.cz/en/section/one-on-one/jirina-siklova-
from-sociologist-to-dissident-smuggler-to-pre-
emancipated-feminist, Jiřina Šiklová, ‘The “Grey Zone” and 
the Future of Dissent in Czechoslovakia,’ Social Research, 
57, 1990, 2, 347-363.) 
Petra James pointed out that the question of female 





Research was initiated by Jonathan Bolton and his 
monograph Worlds of Dissent (2012). Bolton bases his 
analysis of the Czechoslovak dissent on interpretations of 
literary creations of various members of the dissent, be it 
fiction or essayistic production. In his insightful 
commentaries Bolton reveals clear narrative and discursive 
strategies that give the community of Czechoslovak 
dissidents a mythical structure and dimension. He addresses 
the absence of women from these master narratives of 
dissent and gives first clues to how to understand and 
further investigate the topic. 
Jakub Machek underlined, that in case of the Czech 
Republic, one cannot talk about decline of the feminism and 
its reclaiming the public sphere as feminist voice has been 
weak and diverse for the last 30 years. Maybe, the youngest 
generation are more open to the feminist ideas, so there is 
chance that the society will change in the future. But as a 
current discussion shows, the majority of Czech society 
considers women traditionally in the first place as mothers, 
who should give up their work and carrier for the benefit of 
their children. In the following example he wanted to show 
how the conservative rhetoric is embedded in the Czech 
society. The 1950s state socialist attempts of full 
emancipation were refused already in 1960, and the 
conservative attitude has been strengthened during the 
1970s and 1980s normalization regime and continuing till 
nowadays. In the 1950s, it was propagated the collective 
crèches for very small children in order to mothers can 
return to work as soon as possible. But Czech psychologist 
and childcare reformers stated already in late 1950s that 
this crèche system will lead to the psychological deprivation 
of the children, and in the 1960s longer maternity leave was 
introduced. The paid parental or rather maternity leave had 
been prolonged during 1970s to increase the birth rate, a 
trend reinforced repeatedly in the post-communist era, 
making maternity leave 4 years as of now. The last recent 
public debate was heated when the government tried to 
guarantee the Kindergarten for every child older than two 
years. The majority refused it, perceiving it similarly as in 
the 1960s as dangerous for children and as selfish demand 





Zuzana Poláčková: Inspiring, 
supporting, but without any 
significant impact: the role of 
Western European countries 
during the events of 1968 in 
Czechoslovakia 
The two leading superpowers,  the Soviet Union and 
the USA, played the decisive role in international relations 
after the Second World War. This bipolar division of the 
world has been one of the major international constants and 
characteristic features of the Cold War, which, since 1945, 
went through different phases. The superpowers were 
aware of the devastating consequences of their possible 
nuclear conflict. In the 1960s, the new level  of strategic 
policy of détente was set up. The reality of the bipolar world 
required it, especially after the construction of the Berlin 
Wall in 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The 
outbreak of a global conflict with the use of nuclear 
weapons was potentially at stake. After the resolution of this 
crisis, the bipolar division of the world was consolidated. 
Both superpowers carefully protected their spheres of 
influence. 
The superpowers therefore did not regard the use of 
violence in the sphere of the influence of its adversary as a 
reason for direct confrontation. This is the answer to the 
question why the United States and Western Europe did not 
actively engage in favor of occupied Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968. 
The US was fully engaged on the domestic political 
scene due to demonstrations of the population against the 
Vietnam War as well. In Western Europe, the population 
                                                   
18 Szobi, Pavel. Portugalci v „ komunistické Ženevě“. Praha 
jako středisko antisalazaristické opozie (1948-1974). In: Soudobé 
dějiny 4/2014, pp. 609-635 
 
had been demonstrating against conservative governments, 
and in May 1968 large student demonstrations took place. 
As far as Western Europe is concerned, the 
consequences of the 1968 military intervention of the CSSR 
can be divided into three categories: 
1. the consequences for the European communist 
parties 
2. the reflection in society and public opinion 
3. the response of governments and institutions 
1. Most of the communist parties criticized the military 
intervention, including the two largest: the French and 
Italian CPs, although  the PCI in Italy was more radical in 
its criticism. 
The interesting fact is that the Communist Party of 
Portugal actually supported  the intervention.18 This was 
related to its illegality in Portugal, dominated by the dictator 
Salazar and its consequent financial dependence on Moscow. 
Alvaro Cunhal, chairman of the party, spent many years in 
Prague and Moscow. 
2. Public opinion in Western Europe encouraged the 
dissidents and condemned the intervention in 
Czechoslovakia, so the individual communist parties had to 
condemn the intervention as well in order to survive as 
a relevant political force in their respective countries.  Of 
particular interest is the example of Luxembourg, where the 
CP supported the intervention. The CP did not suffer the 
consequences of this attitude, as it managed to get in the 
parliamentary elections in December 1968 with 13.1 % of 
the vote, i.e. 2/3 more than the CP parties in the 
Netherlands and Belgium usually got.19  Newspapers in the 
Netherlands and Belgium reacted with horror and shock to 
the invasion. So did the general population, regardless of 
their political orientation. All left-wing parties in the 
Netherlands condemned the invasion, which they 
19  Wehenkel, Henri/ Foety, Guy/ Hoffmann, André, 1921-
1981. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei 






interpreted as suppression of the attempt to introduce more 
freedom and democracy. The Communist party of Holland 
also condemned it. The majority of the Communist party of 
Belgium supported an attitude of its leadership, who 
condemned it. Only a minority in Liege did not. The invasion 
did not stop the growth of the Old Left (including the 
commuist parties), even less the growth of the New Left 
( left wing socialists, anarchists, Trotskyists, Maoists). It 
mainly damaged the prestige of the Soviet Union. 
3. In general, the governments in western Europe 
condemned the intervention. They adopted a critical 
attitude, but on the other hand, their priority was to 
maintain peace within the bipolar division of the world and, 
in this context, dialogue with Moscow. 
In this context, it is perhaps useful to mention the 
specific position of Austria. As a close neighbor of 
Czechoslovakia, Austria was a mediator of positive Western 
European political and social trends there. Austria continued 
to mediate democracy even after 1969, when the border 
was closed and the “normalization“ process started. 
Austrian radio and television ORF had a great impact on the 
social situation in the 1970s and on relations with 
Czechoslovak dissidents, and the same was true during the 
restoration of democracy in Czechoslovakia after 1989. At 
the same time, Austria was the most generous provider of 
asylum for immigrants from Czechoslovakia.  
It is important to realize that only after 1955, after the 
signing of the treaty called the Staatsvertrag, Austria could 
begin to manage its own foreign policy independently. 
Therefore, Austria did not influence the rise of the Cold War. 
Until the end of 1955, Austria was occupied by the four 
powers, and at that time constituted a transitional territory 
in a polarized Europe, a territory that was controlled by the 
Western powers as well as the USSR.  Austrian-Soviet 
relations were another determining factor which, besides 
Austria´s proclaimed neutrality, played a decisive role in 
formulating the Austrian position on the invasion of the 
CSSR. 
The first test of the new Austrian neutrality were the 
events in Hungary in 1956, when around 180-thousand  
Hungarian refugees passed through Austria. Kurt Waldheim, 
the Austrian minister for foreign affairs in 1968, stated that 
the international situation in 1968 was more complicated 
than in 1956. In his opinion, there was a serious possibility 
that troops of the Warsaw pact could occupy Austria or that 
Austria might become a corridor for an invasion and attack 
on Yugoslavia and Romania. The invasion of the Warsaw 
pact in the CSSR triggered feelings of anxiety among 
Austrian government officials, as well as the population. 
Chancellor Josef Klaus, on behalf of the Austrian 
government, emphasised that Austria would keep its neutral 
position and the rule of non-intervention in the affairs of 
neighbouring states. At the same time, however, he did not 
forget to add that Austria would provide Czechoslovakia 
with humanitarian aid and take care of any refugees 
possibly arriving. 
In the process of communication between the 
populations of Austria and Czechoslovakia, Austrian radio 
and television played an important role, which had already 
begun with broadcasting in the mid 1960s. During 1968, 
Helmut Zilk, a former program director of ORF and later a 
well-known mayor of Vienna, struggled for a mutual 
understanding of citizens of both states by organizing the 
so-called Stadtgespräche. The population in the 
surroundings of Bratislava could watch Austrian television 
ORF and get from it more objective and independent 
information. 
The ORF also broadcasted the speech of Chancellor 
Klaus on August 22, 1968:  
The federal government closely monitors the 
developments in neighboring Czechoslovakia with big 
empathy. Our concerns relate mainly to three things: 
respect for international law, for the Charter of the UN, and 
for the rights of small states. The policy of the Austrian 
government has already focused for a long time on reducing  
tension and on security and cooperation in Europe. The 
Austrian government, from the position of a neutral state, 
regrets that the present situation might compromise this 





development of cooperation between the Danubian states 
might be interrupted.20 
ORF hosted representatives of the KPÖ (Austrian 
Communist Party) several times, who surprisingly 
condemned the invasion, despite the generally well-known 
fact that the leadership of the party was heavily dependent 
on Moscow and its ideology. The leadership of the KPÖ 
actually evaluated the invasion much sharper than the 
conservative Chancellor Klaus.  
The CP of Austria, along with the French communists, 
tried to convene in October 1968, a separate meeting of the 
West European communist parties in order to discuss the 
causes and consequences of the crisis in the KSČ 
(Communist Party of Czechoslovakia). Representatives of 
the CP of the Soviet Union, however, banned it and so 
caused a crisis in the Austrian Communist Party. The party 
lost many members and became completely marginalised. 
The US ambassador to Austria, Douglas MacArthur, 
communicated with Klaus in Vienna.  He presented the 
opinion of the American president, Lyndon B. Johnson, that 
the invasion  would harm the process of détente and 
exacerbate tensions in the bipolar world. Simultaneously, he 
rejected the idea that NATO should play an active role in 
helping to defend the Austrian border. 
The occupation of Czechoslovakia was a test for 
Austrian-Soviet bilateral relations, which, paradoxically, it 
did not harm or interrupt. On the contrary, they improved 
since both sides wanted to continue to benefit from mutual 
economic cooperation and long-term stability. The invasion, 
however, had serious  consequences for Austria on the 
domestic political level. It caused a governmental crisis and 
the fall of the Klaus government in 1970.  
The influence of the 1968 invasion on the 
foreign policy of Czechoslovakia in relation to 
Western Europe  
                                                   
20 See Poláčková, Zuzana: Za oponou slovensko-rakúskych 
vzťahov v 20. storočí.(Behind the Courtain of Slovak- Austrian 
Relations in the 20th Century), Bratislava, 2013, p.140. 
The 1968 invasion somehow intensified both the 
antagonistic and the coexistential aspects of the relationship 
between Czechoslovakia and the West. The liberal reform 
policy  of Alexander Dubček and the reform–communist 
government was suppressed with the argument that it had 
been anti- socialist and counter-revolutionary and had been 
inspired by bourgeois-democratic ideas and illusions. Any 
basis for coexistence would have to be defined in terms of 
negotiations between the two different social and political 
systems. For the post-1968 Czechoslovak government, 
Western Europe was the principal ideological and political 
ennemy. On the other hand, the more liberal part of 
Czechoslovak society was deeply disappointed with no 
reaction and almost no help from Western Europe. In 
international relations, the invasion was characterized as an 
international crisis, not as a military occupation, because 
Czechoslovakia did not mobilize the army. Only one 
politician openly characterized the invasion as an 
occupation – President of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito. 
On the other hand, the “normalization“ of 
Czechoslovak society and the Soviet bloc’s consolidation 
was a priority.. This meant that the policy of détente and 
peaceful coexistence had to be continued and even 
intensified in order to enjoy a period of quiet and stability. 
The communist regimes were talking of peace, which is no 
coincidence as they needed a measure of détente and even 
pragmatic cooperation with Western Europe in order to feel 
secure and to be able to improve the economy. Their wish 
to further develop peaceful coexistence led them to engage 
in the Helsinki proces of detente and cooperation. However, 
the human rights aspect of this was a “ticking time 
bomb“ behind the facàde. The founders of Charta 77 knew 
this.  
However, autonomous Czechoslovak foreign policy 
ceased to exist step by step. Important decisions were 
made in Moscow, and after 1969, this trend was even 
strenghtened. Moscow  condemned the speech of 





who accused Warsaw Pact  troops of violating  international 
law when occupying Czechoslovakia.  His successor, Bohuš 
Chńoupek, obeyed Moscow. The sovereignty of 
Czechoslovakia was further reduced by the Agreement on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Help signed on the 6th 
of May 1970. It was to be in force for 20 years. The most 
important diplomatic activity during the years of 
normalization, the bilateral agreement between 
Czechoslovakia and West Germany was initiated in Moscow 
as well. The most important outcome of this agreement was 
the annulment of the Munich Agreement, and of course 
collaboration in the context of the Ostpolitik. The next result 
of détente was the Helsinki peace process,  which was 
based on the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt and on détente, 
which had already started in Geneva between Nikita 
Khrushchev and Dwight Eisenhower in 1955. It was further 
developed later by US President Lyndon Johnson and Leonid 
Brežnev, which led in the 1970s to the most important 
period of détente, called the Helsinki Peace Process. It was 
composed of 3 baskets. The first one was dealing with 
security and cooperation; the second one was about 
cooperation in the economy and culture; and the third dealt 
with human and minority rights. The fact that the 1968 
invasion meant another 20 years of communism, meant that 
many social  and cultural changes taking place in Western 
Europe during 1968 - 1989 were not experienced and 
absorbed in Eastern Europe.This gave the Visegrad 
countries a rather provincial outlook on their own situation 
and on Europe. 
 
What do the events of the 1968 invasion mean 
for the Czech and Slovak Republic and Europe from 
today’s perspective? 
The first lesson of the event is the importance and 
necessity of defending and working for democracy. 
Although liberal democracy is still the predominant political 
system and political culture in Europe today, it would be 
naive and historically wrong to claim that it is an 
uncontested or unalterable tradition. The course of the 
twentieth century has shown that Europe is susceptible to 
forms of anti-liberal democracy, of which Hungary’s ‘illiberal 
democracy’ is a case in point, authoritarianism, and even 
totalitarianism from east to west. The communist regimes 
in Central and Eastern Europe after 1945 were the longest 
chapter in the tragic story of undemocratic regimes in 
Europe. However, the right-wing dictatorships of Portugal 
and Spain lasted until the 1970s, and Greece experienced a 
similar regime as well. The current developments in Poland 
and Hungary may be further proof of the structural 
weakness of liberal democracy in several parts of Europe, 
and it is by no means certain that only the post-communist 
countries are vulnerable to this. Right-wing populism and its 
promise of a post-liberal alternative cannot be categorized 
as a marginal phenomenon anymore, having risen to 
prominence both across the East and West spectrum of 
Europe, as well as globally as evident by recent political 
developments in Brazil and the US. . Thus, the second 
message of the Prague Spring is to this day still relevant: 
that it is necessary to defend European unity as much as 
possible lest Europe once again becomes the theatre of 
global struggles by superpowers, who may have different 
political and strategic interests than those of Europe. 
In this context, the events of 1968 are still a relevant 
political issue because they show that authoritarianism does 
not work in the long run in Europe, and that only democratic 
participation of the mass of citizens can constitute 







Michal Vít: How the events of  
the 1968 influenced regional 
cooperation? 
The events of the 1968 in Czechoslovakia have 
significant impact of the way in which the cooperation in 
regional context has been shaped after 1990. The invasion 
of Soviet troops enabled Czechoslovakia to develop a myth 
of victimhood and betrayed state together with Hungary 
and later also Poland. When focusing on political 
cooperation of new (opposition) elite coming into power 
after the 1990, one can see how these events have been 
used when shaping political cooperation in Central Europe. 
The sort of common denominator for the cooperation can 
be defined as shared “post traumatic cooperation” that 
generated shared goal of foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland. When evaluating these events in 
regional context, one can clearly see that these events have 
been used as a significant legacy that boosted intellectual 
and dissident cooperation in late 1980s and in early 1990s. 
One can even argue that the invasion, from regional 
perspective, significantly contributed to the impetus for the 
reintegration of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia into 
Europe. Namely, using narration of the shared past 
experience of Soviet oppression was one of the main tools 
boosting regional cooperation. This allowed these countries 
to be treated as a regional group (Visegrad group) with 
shared past experience and same political goal; EU 
integration.  
Even though dissident cooperation was the main 
driving force behind reintegration in early 1990s, the 
personal representation of intellectuals in politics has been 
reduced during the first subsequent decade significantly. 
This has resulted in the replacement of intellectuals sharing 
similar understanding of regional cooperation with 
representatives that shared a rather pragmatic approach to 
political praxis without grounded understanding and 
support of regional cooperation. The return of short-term 
oriented politics has also meant a decline of narrative power 
when it comes to 1968.  
From a contemporary perspective, the debate about 
the events of 1968 is led by two main streams. The first one 
is defined by marginal interest in terms of the actual events 
but rather a questioning of the aims of the instigators of the 
uprisings under the communist regime. The second one still 
seeks to define the uniqueness of the events in 
Czechoslovakia. It adopts a Czech society-oriented 
approach trying to re-establish significant social impact in 
national and also regional context. Both these mainstreams 
in some way miss broader impact and consequences within 
Central Europe. Was the Czechoslovak experience really 
unique? Was the Prague Spring of 1968 different in a 
regional context? Or, from different perspective, did the 
Prague Spring followed by the invasion of 1968 yield a 
significant impact on understanding shared experience of 
Central European countries? When searching for answer to 
these question, one can find that there is significant lack of 
understanding and research seeking to answer these 
important questions. 
With the erosion of the intellectual-led narrative based 
on the experience of 1968 in a regional context, one can 
observe that there is only limited aim to research the events 
in Hungary and Poland from similar perspective. On the 
contrary, there is still a preference to further develop own 
“national stories”, which are part of social and political 
mainstream, but miss deeper understanding and meaning 
of events of 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and 
1970/1980 in Poland. From a different perspective, Central 
European countries lack unifying intellectuals to lead the 
public debate when it comes to seeking common ground for 
understanding. However, this is very often developed and 
brought to the discussion by experts on Central Europe 
(meaning external interest) who understand individual 
countries as a region, more specifically - Visegad Group. 
Thus, they de facto search for complex understanding of 
turbulent development in Central Europe, but they lack 
broader impact on regional/national political and social 
narratives in respected countries and often in V4 region and 
such. That being said, it is in to some extent regrettable that 
intellectuals in Central Europe sometimes shirk away from 
seeking patterns and answers to uncomfortable questions, 
such as if the national “trauma” of 1968 is really as 





made out to be, and if the use of 1968 in political discourse 
is not too artificial. In this context, the experience of events 
of 1968 – perceived by current circumstances – has not 
risen to prominence in terms of societal debate. 
Nonetheless, the invasion is still used as an identity-shaping 
event instead of a topic to be researched in terms of its 
impact on society. As a result, the debate is very concerned 
with the event as such and less in terms of regional 
development. In addition to that, since the political 
narration shortly after 1990 has been driven by intellectuals 
who lived through the regional cooperation in late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the Czech and regional debate miss the 
critical perspective when evaluating the broader 
consequences of the 1968.  
Therefore, in the current debate, the impact in 
national context is heavily discussed contrary to what it 
means in the contemporary political and social discussions. 
This makes the discourse surrounding the event 
predominantly self-oriented and insular. However, it would 
be much more beneficial if the meanings and understanding 
of the event and its legacy, also for future generations, was 
developed more in contextual terms of regional cooperation 
over time. It means to tackle changes in time and to 
evaluate the crucial period of the end of communism in 
Central Europe and democratic uprising to evaluate the 
added value of regional cooperation shortly after the 
collapse of communist regime  
Nevertheless, this is not only the case of the Czech 
Republic, but also in Central Europe as such. Lack of 
intellectually-led discussions has resulted in a situation in 
which the debate in closed within its national boundaries 
and is heavily dominated by domestic political aims. Since 
Central European countries develop their common 
denominators of shared interests only with difficulties, it is, 
indeed, understandable that the implications of national 
uprisings in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have 
played so significant role. 
Evaluating the events of 1968, one can say that the 
past experience in the context of Central Europe was an 
important impulse for both reclaiming democracy as well as 
being an important impetus for strengthening joint-efforts 
towards integration into Western communities. At the same 
time, the impact of the events declines over time as they 
are repurposed towards perpetuating a myth of victimhood 
rather than developing a better understanding of the 
regional context. Even though Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic perceive their experience as unique, the 
origins, meanings, as well as impact on individual societies 
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